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Abstract 
The work of Ezequiel Di Paolo and Hanne De Jaegher has helped to transform the 
enactive approach from relative obscurity into a hotly debated contender for the fu-
ture science of social cognition and cognitive science more generally. In this short in-
troduction I situate their contributions in what I see as important aspects of the bigger 
picture that is motivating and inspiring them as well as the rest of this young commu-
nity. In particular, I sketch some of the social issues that go beyond mere academic 
debate, including how the methods and assumptions that inform orthodox cognitive 
science  are  intrinsically  related  to  the  critical  state  of  affairs  in  our  world  today. 
I conclude with some personal recollections in order to give an idea of the context in 
which their ideas, and mine as well, came to fruition. 
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I am glad that Avant has provided a platform for Ezequiel Di Paolo and Hanne De 
Jaegher, a pair of avant-garde scientists and philosophers, to air their views in the 
open format of an interview. Their articles are already consistently pushing the boun-
daries of accepted conventional wisdom within the confines of the rigid etiquettes, 
rules and regulations of academic publishing. But in this interview we are given the 
rare opportunity to hear from them more directly and personally, and we get a sense 
that their published output so far is only the visible tip of a deep iceberg that, like life 
itself, still remains to be more fully explored. There are surely still many additional 
ideas and surprises to be revealed that will help us to finally overturn the doomed 
neuro-computationalist dogma. And the sooner, the better. The most celebrated in-
sights  of  current  scientific  thinking  about  what  we  human  beings  essentially  are, 
namely, that we are nothing but selfish, genetically pre-programmed zombies, passive 
robots, and/or disembodied brain-minds, have already been causing damage for far 
too long. It’s time to stop that grotesque and inhuman masquerade! There are more 
convincing scientific alternatives. Tom Froese: Sense-making with a little help ... 
 
144
But the work of Ezequiel and Hanne is not just about unmasking the hubris of compu-
tationalism. Clearly, there is more at stake in their work than contesting the next big 
ideas in science and philosophy. And here is why: It simply cannot be denied that the 
subject of cognitive science (i.e. the scientific observer, usually a psychologist) and the 
object of cognitive science (the so-called ‘subject’ or, to use the politically correct term, 
the ‘participant’, who is usually a psychologist, too) are one and the same: a human 
being. Accordingly, scientific claims about life, mind and sociality cannot be divorced 
from how we find ourselves to be right now, and how we wish ourselves to be in the 
future. The human condition is not a static given; it is an open-ended process of be-
coming that we shape and enact with our choices and actions.  
These are, therefore, not merely academic issues confined to the ivory tower; they 
have direct implications for politics, for personal responsibility, and for how we can 
and should live our existences. Despite what orthodox science dictates, the personal 
and professional aspect of our lives cannot be lived independently from each other. 
The standard practice of ignoring the evidence of one’s own first-person perspective, 
especially when the very topic of one’s professional study is the personal-level of hu-
man existence, is irresponsible and ethically indefensible. Why should our findings be 
considered more objective when we aim to exclude the only genuine access to the per-
sonal-level that we have, namely our own lived existence as human beings? We all 
know from our own personal lives that there is more to people than what is revealed 
by recordings of internal physiological data and measurements of external movement 
patterns. And given the polarity of current public debate, it needs to be pointed out 
that this rejection of scientific reductionist approaches to our own first-person pers-
pective does not entail a commitment to some kind of religious totalitarianism. What-
ever happened to simply acknowledging our personal existence in the here and now? 
Consequently, if we want to reject scientific and religious dogma, it is also up to every-
one to show in his or her own life that the mainstream theories are wrong. For exam-
ple, as Ezequiel correctly points out, the individualist-computationalist paradigm is 
only more or less valid as long asmost of us choose to continue the social game of be-
ing ‘perfect consumers’ of preformed products and information. Every time we be-
have like a mere reactive robot, we give tacit support to the computational theory of 
mind,  which,  as  the  dominant  paradigm  in  science,  in  turn  influences  the  way  in 
which we think it is possible to behave. And to some extent this unsatisfactory state of 
affairs is methodologically enforced in the lab. As every psychologist knows very well, 
those ‘participants’ who do not follow the given instructions of the experiment are 
excluded from the results and do not appear in the final analysis. The unpredictability 
and  uncontrollability  of  genuine  human  autonomy  are  excluded  by  society  and 
science as madness and noise, respectively. Functionalism selectively filters the facts 
of our existence. What we need instead is a practice and theory of mind that takes the 
open-endedness of human autonomy as its starting point, and as its ultimate point of 
return. 
But the issues go even deeper than that. Because even if we happened to believe what 
mainstream science tries to convince us of, namely that we are isolated and indepen-
dent brain-minds, we can only make sense of this belief in the context of a shared AVANT Volume III, Number 2/2012 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
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world.  Our  living  body,  other  persons  and  the  environment  are  always  already 
present before we choose to ignore them. This blindness to its own range of depen-
dencies, whether they are biological, social, or ecological, is what makes the modernist 
episteme so toxic and deadly to a human future on this planet, like a cancer that is 
unwittingly committing suicide by blindly consuming its host organism. However, this 
failure of methodological individualism is not meant to imply a return to some form of 
totalitarian socialism. Ezequiel and Hanne are careful to emphasize that they do not 
want to reduce the individual to the social, or vice versa. Their stated aim is to move 
beyond that kind of linear-reductionist way of thinking altogether. Indeed, to think 
that the negation of one position must necessarily entail acceptance of its logical oppo-
site is precisely to remain stuck in a linear mode of thinking. Why not try to change 
the terms of the debate altogether? Accordingly, one of the main tasks for the enactive 
approach is to create new conceptual tools for better grasping the complex interde-
pendencies between life, mind and sociality, including our own intimate personal ex-
perience as well as genuine human autonomy. From this alternative perspective we 
can also understand why Ezequiel and Hanne’s preferred point of departure is to ex-
plore this complex network of interdependent processes by focusing on the level of 
autonomous dynamics emerging out of social interaction between two or more people. 
“Participatory sense-making” offers a middle way, an intermediate level of analysis, 
between the two extremes of individualism and socialism.  
Let me conclude this introduction with some personal recollections. I first came across 
initial formulations of this enactive approach by reading Ezequiel’s papers on agent-
based models of communication and social interaction, while I was still a student in 
the Department of Cybernetics at the University of Reading. It was that work which 
convinced me that I should do my PhD at the University of Sussex, where Ezequiel was 
lecturing at the time. When I arrived there at the end of 2004, I was fortunate to end 
up in the same research center as Hanne, who was just finishing her dissertation on 
autism and participatory sense-making. I still remember my 6 years at Sussex fondly. 
There were many creative people with various kinds of backgrounds and interests 
interacting in a mutually inspiring manner, and lots of free-spirited ideas were float-
ing around the lab. Some of these were discussed more publicly in the Life and Mind 
seminars and can still be found online at our blog
47. In the following interview Hanne 
nicely describes this kind of style of research as a “horizontal” interaction, rather than 
the usual dominance hierarchies that stand in the way of genuine collaboration. Hori-
zontal interaction enables collective emergence of creativity. 
In this collaborative spirit Ezequiel agreed to become my doctoral supervisor, and this 
turned out to be a highly productive relationship. We have been working on many 
projects together to push the enactive approach forward. In particular, we made a 
series of agent-based models, which demonstrated the enabling and constraining ef-
fects of social interaction dynamics on the behavior of individual agents. In 2008, to-
gether with Hanne, and Steve Torrance, we organized a workshop with the theme of 
participatory sense-making, which turned out to be a great participatory success. But 
even  before  then  I  was  convinced  that  Ezequiel  and  Hanne’s  “Participatory  sense-
                                                             
47 http://lifeandmind.wordpress.com Tom Froese: Sense-making with a little help ... 
 
146
making” paper had hit the jackpot. I remember philosophizing with Ezequiel at one of 
the many get-togethers in a small bar in Brighton. I had just finished reading a draft of 
their paper, and I said that they had a citation classic on their hands. Ezequiel was also 
optimistic, but observed that the jury was still out. Now, 5 years later, and Ezequiel 
and Hanne’s modesty notwithstanding, that particular paper has turned into one of 
the most hotly debated articles of the enactive approach. Moreover, that paper has 
managed to achieve what most other contributions to this approach have so far failed 
to accomplish: it has started a mutual dialog with mainstream researchers of social 
cognition. Now that we have this small opening of attention, it is up to enactivists eve-
rywhere to keep up the good work and to make sure that we live up to our own expec-
tations, both personally and professionally.  
 